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Addressing the problem 
Proofs are used in mathematics, in philosophy, in jurisprudence, and in 
everyday life. The basic assumption of this investigation is that there exist a 
system of cognitive components that allows for judging and constructing 
proofs. If the process of proving of a given statement depends solely on 
having known the truth value and the proof itself, some things would be 
contradictory. We may realize that proofs constructed by the same individual 
but on different domains are quite similar to each other. It is also evident 
that we can judge other people's proofs even if we are unfamiliar with the 
topic. The system of cognitive components that may allow for judging and 
constructing proofs can be defined as proving ability. The aim of this study 
is to describe the nature of proving ability 
Theoretical bases for the nature and 
development of proving ability 
In order to characterize proving ability it is necessary to construct a 
pedagogical-psychological concept of ' p roo f . Three different 
interpretations of proofs can be found in the dictionaries: philosophical, 
mathematical and jurisprudential. 
It is about 2000 years since a hierarchical system of authoritarian, 
empirical and deductive proofs existed. In Thomas Aquinas' opinion - that 
is based on Boethius' remark - authoritarian proofs are of little value from a 
scientific point of view. Deductive proofs are more valuable because they 
make it possible to go beyond human experience. A fundamental question 
about deductive proofs is the truth and validity of axioms on which 
deductive proofs are based. Descartes pointed out that the ways of 
mathematical thinking are not necessarily the same as the ways of 
publishing the results in the classic definition-theorem-proof sequence. 
The problem of the vicious circle of theorems and axioms has been 
solved by Hegel: the axioms, in fact, are not starting points in constructing 
proofs, but they can often be the result of scientific development. In several 
cases the axioms can be proven in another system of scientific facts. 
Philosophers from Vienna made further steps towards an appropriate 
definition of the proving process. The core of their verification theory: The 
meaning of a sentence is the same as the process of stating the truth value of 
the sentence that is the mode of verification. Hans Hahn emphasizes the 
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importance of logic applied in the proving process. His idea is that a 
statement can implicitly contain lots of other statements; the crucial role of 
logic is to make clear what have been stated. In the second half of the 20'h 
century, Popper and Lakatos made great contributions to the development of 
a philosophical concept of proof. 
In mathematics, the development of the concept of proof spans over 
centuries. Till the 19'h century, mathematical proofs were of psychological 
nature: to make something clear or to demonstrate the truth of a theory by 
means of citing formerly proven statements and facts (Tarski, 1990). The 
important and characteristic elements of formal mathematical proofs (i. e., 
definitions, axioms, postulates, theorems) were consistently used for the first 
time in Euclid's 'Elements' (about 300 B. C.). In our century, mathematical 
proof theory has set as the aim to investigate the consistency and being free 
of contradiction of axiomatic systems - without using set theoretical tools. 
Proofs in mathematics are demonstrations in order to reveal the deducibility 
of a statement in a finite number of steps. Deductive-axiomatic proof theory 
has to cope with challenges from different branches of mathematics 
(constructivist mathematics, experimental mathematics, computer-associated 
mathematical proofs). 
In jurisprudence, the basic principle is that proofs must be deductive 
in the scientific sense of deduction. Nevertheless, in jurisprudence, there is a 
great emphasis on inductive processes in the phase of gathering information. 
From a psychological point of view, we emphasize the difference 
between the sequence of reasoning processes and the sequence of publishing 
the results of proving. Consequently, lessons from mathematical concept of 
proof may help in constructing a pedagogical-psychological concept of 
proof that can be applicable in non-mathematical domains as well. 
Therefore, proofs can be considered as the results of processes that aimed to 
demonstrate the truth value of a statement. 
A pedagogical-psychological concept of proving ability must take into 
account the results of ability research. We have several choices (i. e., factor 
analytical concept of ability, abilities of experimental psychology), and we 
decided to embed proving ability in a multi-level, hierarchical concept of 
cognitive abilities. Three level models of human thinking that go beyond the 
factor analytical approach have appeared in the last 2-3 decades. In 
Sternberg's triarchic model (1988), the term 'white-collar components' 
refers to the meta-components of human thinking. These components plan, 
monitor and evaluate the functioning of lower-level ( 'blue-collar') 
components. The work of blue-collar or executive components can be 
characterized as algorithmic processes when solving problems. 
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As to proving ability, we speak about - using in part Marr's (1982) 
terminology - hardware-, algorithmic and strategy-level. This triarchic 
system is similar to that of Nagy's (1998) who describes neural, implicit 
experimental, implicit conceptual and explicit decision levels as hierarchical 
strata of thinking: The strategy-leyel of proving ability contains Moshman's 
(1990) meta-logic and Johnson-Laird's meta-deduction (see Johnson-Laird 
and Byrne, 1991). The algorithmic level contains forms of reasoning 
described by classical experimental psychology, among them it is deductive 
reasoning that may have great importance when constructing or analyzing 
proofs. In this investigation we considered the hardware-level of proving 
ability as functioning normally in every subject. 
Investigating the development of proving ability requires setting up an 
external system of criteria in order to compare individuals to each other and 
to the external criteria. It can be a hard task for researchers to find a valid 
system of criteria; nevertheless, cultural differences must be taken into 
account. If we borrow the authoritarian-empirical-deductive order of 
development from philosophy, we must be strong to reveal that deductive 
proofs are the most valuable not because of being the last in the order of 
appearance, but because of being the most difficult to achieve. Difficulties 
with deductive proofs can be in part derived from the late development of 
logical necessity in human reasoning. 
Whatever kinds of abilities are studied, the basic principle of 
psychometrics should be respected: The development of an ability can be 
determined through the difficulties of problems solved successfully by the 
individual. Human performance on cognitive task is influenced by the 
context of the problem-solving situation. The problem of contextual effects 
can be summarized as follows: Two tasks that are identical or very similar to 
each other even in the content of the tasks may be of different difficulty 
because of the context. The contextual effects may cause significant 
differences in performance. 
Fostering proving ability requires getting acquainted with the results 
of mathematics education. Consequences derived from training on proving 
skill or ability can be generalized to other domains as well. One important 
principle emphasizes the need for change in the traditional theorem-proof-
definition order to a reversed 'proof-theorem-definition' sequence. Another 
basic principle is using metacognitive tools. One example may be Polya's 
famous list of metacognitive questions. 
Taking the view-point of educational assessment into account in this 
investigation we used Harel and Sowder's (1998) proof schemes that were 
developed for mathematical proofs but could be applicable to non-
mathematical content, too. We used five main proof-schemes in this 
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research: authoritarian, ritual, symbolic, empirical, and analytical 
(deductive) proofs. 
Research questions 
Research questions and hypotheses from the literature have to be re-
formulated for the purposes of this study, since this research integrated 
several fields and paradigms from a new point of view. Research questions 
and the main hypotheses of the dissertation deal with basic theoretical 
questions on the nature and development of proving ability. 
1) A pedagogical-psychological concept of proofs can be based on the 
philosophical, mathematical and jurisprudential concepts of proof. The 
pedagogical-psychological concept of proof must address the cognitive 
processes required for judging and constructing proofs. We must emphasize 
that from the beginning of our research we consistently avoided restricting 
the concept of proving ability to mathematical proving skills. 
2) The hierarchical-multilevel model of proving ability must be based 
on the pedagogical-psychological concept of proofs and on the hierarchical 
three-strata models of cognitive abilities described in several monographs in 
the last two decades. From a methodological point of view, we may divide 
proving ability into two subsystems of cognitive components: 1) ability for 
judging proofs, and 2) ability for constructing proofs. 
3) Research methods that address the problem of assessment and 
evaluation of proving ability must take the multi-level nature of proving 
ability into account. Different levels or subsystems of components require 
different evaluation methods to use. The hardware level of proving ability 
can be assessed by means of neuro-physiological and clinical psychological 
methods. Measuring the algorithmic-level components of proving ability 
may effectively result in using tests that have been originally developed for 
measuring deductive reasoning. Assessing the strategic level of proving 
ability may in itself be defined as assessing proving ability. Albeit three-
stratum models of cognition do not allow for assessing algorithmic and 
strategic variables separately because there is a permanent flow of 
information between those levels. This notion is at the same time a critique 
of traditional methods of measuring deductive reasoning. We may also note 
that psychometrics has revealed the phenomenon of positive manifold, that 
is, achievement in tasks on domains that are thought to be very far from one 
another can be similar. 
4) Describing the development of proving ability we are inevitably 
conflicted with the evolutionary approach of human reasoning. In that sense, 
development of proving ability can be described as increasing and 
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decreasing frequency-in-use of different proving schemes. Some schemes 
are more frequently used, some are not, depending on the process of 
enculturation and development of other reasoning processes. 
5) The development of proving ability is determined by the 
development of its sub-components. For example, the development of 
logical necessity - which may play a crucial role in judging and constructing 
deductive proofs - is very slow till the age of 12. 
6) Information given to students about the value of their proving 
schemes influence the development of proving ability can to a great extent. 
In accordance with the evolutionary approach, it can be hypothesized that 
the development of proving ability is a process mediated by internal 
selection (or the process of being selected) of proof schemes. 
There have been a number of hypotheses formulated during the 
process of data analysis: 
• In which grade is there a big change in students' opinion about the 
value of authoritarian proof? 
• Why do so many students overvalue the symbolic proofs? 
• How does the familiarity of the content influence the proofs scheme 
constructed in that domain? 
• How can we construct an index of proving ability on the basis of 
Likert scale results? 
• How can the nature of correlations among proving ability and 
several background variables be characterized? 
Methods 
Within a larger investigation called 'Development of mathematical abilities' 
six tests were administered to 2572 students, in 3 counties in Hungary, 
between April and May, 1998. The sample consisted of children of the 5*^, 
7thi 9th; and n t h grades (with ages ranging from 11 to 17 years). There 
were two additional questionnaires assessing personal data, school marks, 
and mathematics and physics academic self-concept. The tests were 
developed for this study, and two of them were previously piloted. 
The second pool of data (called the 'large scale' investigation) was 
taken in May, 1999. Two tests of proving ability had been developed for 
this study. The first one consisted of mathematical statements each with its 
proofs of 5 types: authoritarian, ritual, symbolic, empirical and deductive. 
Students were required to judge in a five-point Likert scale the value of 
proofs. The second test of proving ability consisted of both closed and open 
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ended questions from various content domains, using students' answer types 
that had been observed a year before. 
A questionnaire was administered to the mathematics teachers of the 
schools that had been involved in the project in both the pilot and the large 
scale investigation. The questionnaires measured teachers' judgments about 
students' most frequently observed proof types (pilot study) and the five 
proof schemes: authoritarian, ritual, symbolic, empirical, and analytical 
(large scale study). 
From a methodological point of view, using non-parametric tests, 
multidimensional scaling and path-analysis might be subjects of special 
_ interest, because these statistical methods are rarely used in Hungarian 
educational research. 
Results 
Results of the pilot study 
A dichotomous categorization system has been developed for each 
task, by which both hierarchical and non-hierarchical evaluations of 
students' proofs can be performed. The nominal categories of this 
dichotomous system can serve as a basis for an hierarchical evaluation of 
proof types: An ordinal scale measure can be developed based on Harel and 
Sowder's proof-categorization system. Three hierarchically ordered stages 
can be identified in their model: 1) externally-based proofs, 2) empirical 
proofs, and 3) analytic proofs. The categories of our dichotomous system 
were transformed into ordinal scale categories on the basis of agreement 
among experts. 
Three expert raters independently recoded the nominal categories 
using an ordinal scale derived from Harel and Sowder's taxonomy. 
Kendall's coefficient of concordance (W=.909, pc.OOl) indicates a high 
level of agreement. In each case it was possible to recode the nominal 
categories into ordinal scale in 3:0 or 2:1 rate. The results suggest that there 
is a tendency to construct higher-order proofs even in non-mathematical 
domains as a function of school grades. Spearman-correlation coefficients 
suggested that there were significant relationships between proof types of 
different domains. 
Mathematics teachers' judgments can be characterized as giving too 
much appreciation to symbolic proofs whereas undervaluing empirical 
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proofs. A source of students' misconceptions about the nature of 
mathematical proofs can be traced back to their teachers' judging proof 
schemes. 
Maths teachers' undervaluing empirical proofs may result in students' 
mathematical academic self-concept of the lowest level in case of 
constructing empirical proofs. (J6zsa and Csikos, 1999). It has also been 
revealed that students' judging proof types can to a great extent be traced 
back to students' ideas about their math teachers' judgments. 
Results of the large scale study 
The reliability coefficients of students' proving ability tests were 
satisfactory. Also Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin-indices were computed in order to 
characterize an aspect of item-consistency. 
Students' judging of different proof types can be summarized as 
follows: 
a) Authoritarian proofs: This type of proofs is widely accepted among 
5'h and graders but are strongly rejected in the sample of 9'h and 1 1'h 
graders. 
b) Ritual proofs: There can be revealed significant differences 
between both age-groups, and - within the 9 ^ and ll1*1 graders' groups -
between grammar school and vocational secondary school students. 
c) Symbolic proofs. In every age-group symbolic proofs obtain higher 
grades than authoritarian and ritual proofs. This may be due to the fact that 
in a mathematical context the appearance of mathematical symbols in itself 
may increase the value of a proof. 
d) Empirical proofs. There were quite large differences between 
empirical proofs of different domains. This can be traced back to the 
difference in the statements from the aspect of containing or not containing 
universal quantifier or to the difference according to Balacheff s (1988) naiv 
empiricism and crucial experiment. 
e) Deductive proofs. In every domain and also in every age-group 
deductive proofs yield the best scores. This means that students even before 
5[h grade are taught to value a certain type of proof. This 'certain' is in our 
culture the type of deductive proofs. 
The difference between age-groups can be characterized as follows: 
- Elementary school pupils score to a greater extent medium or high 
scores to the external proof types. 
- Differences between 9'h and 11 th graders can often be traced back 
to differences in the content. 
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- Students of vocational secondary schools are in the middle between 
elementary and grammar-school students when judging proof types. 
Connections between content-familiarity and proof types in case of 
open-ended tasks has become very clear. If the content is familiar, many 
students feel courage to construct a deductive proof, in spite of the fact that 
a correct deductive proof would require knowledge about facts and rules 
that are not yet known. 
The index of proving ability developed from Likert scale results has 
proven to be a reliable and effective measure of the development of proving 
ability. The curve of the development is similar to the upper branch of 
normal ogiva. This observation supports the hypothesis that proving ability 
can be considered to be an ability in a psychometric sense of the term 
'ability'. 
Students' judges of proof types is a subject of slow changes. From this 
aspect, it is similar to those of scientific misconceptions. Math teachers are, 
however, optimistic in the question of changes, and they are also in 
accordance with each other in the question about age-limits of certain 
processes in the development of proving ability. 
Summary 
The pedagogical-psychological concept of proofs and proving ability 
developed in this investigation is based on proof-concepts developed by 
philosophy, mathematics and jurisprudence. Our concepts are general from 
an aspect of not restricting the content to be proven to mathematical 
theorems, and the concepts are specific from an aspect of formulating 
hypotheses that are relevant and interesting for pedagogy. 
Being in accordance with results from ability research, proving ability 
is a three-level, hierarchical system of cognitive components that allow for 
judging and constructing proofs of a given statement. 
Several tests have been developed for assessing proving ability, and 
they proved to be valid and reliable. 
Concerning the development of proving ability we emphasize two 
features: 1) the system of correlations among test items may be an indicator 
of the development, and 2) using a one-dimensional score to measure 
proving ability, the inflexion point of the developmental curve is around age 
13. 
Mathematics can play an important role in fostering the development 
of proving ability. However, as the results suggest, maths teachers' 
judgments do not necessarily correspond to the hierarchical stages of Harel 
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and Sowder's model. This means that from math teachers' view-point there 
is a positive bias towards symbolic proofs whereas there is a tendency to 
undervalue empirical proofs. 
Practical considerations about the results of the present investigation 
may involve emphasizing the importance of 'exploring the territory' 
(Edwards, 1997) before proving a statement. Statistical tendencies revealed 
by cross-sectional comparisons will give advice to text-book and curriculum 
writers. 
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